# 05 · Banking Solution Blueprints (client-ready) Two end-to-end blueprints you can present to a financial-services client, in the JD's own deliverable formats: **solution architecture + ADRs + phased roadmap + regulatory mapping**. Both reuse the ByteLyst fabric patterns from `01-ecosystem-rag-fabric.md`. --- # Blueprint 1 — Compliance Document Retrieval Assistant **Use case:** compliance analysts ask natural-language questions ("What is our retention obligation for KYC records under the latest policy?") and get a **grounded, cited** answer drawn from regulatory filings, internal policies, and procedure manuals — or an explicit *"insufficient evidence, escalate."* ## Architecture ```mermaid flowchart TB AN[👤 Compliance analyst] --> APP[Assistant UI] APP --> ORCH subgraph ORCH["Agentic orchestration (LangGraph)"] R{{route}} --> RET[retrieve] --> GR{{CRAG grade}} GR -- weak --> RW[HyDE rewrite] --> RET GR -- ok --> GEN[generate + cite] --> CR{{Self-RAG critic}} CR -- ungrounded --> RW CR -- grounded --> OUT[answer + clause citations] CR -- no evidence --> ESC[escalate to human] end subgraph RETR["Hybrid retrieval"] VEC[(Azure AI Search
vector + BM25 + semantic rerank)] KG[(Cosmos Gremlin
policy ⇄ regulation graph)] end RET --> VEC & KG subgraph GOV["Governance plane"] ACL[role-aware ACL filter] AUD[event-store audit] CARD[model card + decision log] end RET -.-> ACL GEN -.-> AUD OUT -.-> CARD ``` **Why these choices (headline ADRs below):** Azure AI Search gives managed hybrid + semantic rerank inside one audit boundary; the Gremlin graph links *policies ↔ controlling regulations* so "what regulation drives this clause" is a traversal, not a guess; the critic + escalate edge guarantees no confident-wrong answers on compliance questions. ## Ingestion (layout-aware, provenance-first) ```mermaid flowchart LR DOC[Filings · policies · procedures
PDF/DOCX/scans] --> PARSE[PyMuPDF / Unstructured.io
+ OCR fallback] PARSE --> CHUNK[layout + semantic chunking
tables preserved] CHUNK --> META[attach provenance
doc·page·section·effective-date·sensitivity] META --> EMB[embed] --> IDX[(Azure AI Search index per tenant)] META --> GRAPH[(extract policy↔reg edges → Gremlin)] ``` > **Effective-date metadata is a compliance requirement, not a nicety:** retrieval must be > able to answer "as of" a date and never cite a superseded policy as current. ## Phased delivery | Phase | Scope | Exit criteria | |---|---|---| | **0 · Discovery (2–3 wks)** | Corpus inventory, sensitivity classification, golden-question set with SMEs, success SLAs | Signed-off SLA sheet (faithfulness ≥ 0.9, citation 100%, abstain instead of guess) | | **1 · PoC (4–6 wks)** | Hybrid retrieval over a bounded corpus, citations, abstain path | Beats keyword search on the golden set; every answer cited or escalated | | **2 · Hardening (6–8 wks)** | Graph links, role-aware ACL, RAGAS/DeepEval CI gate, drift monitor | SLAs met under eval harness; controls mapped to SR 11-7 | | **3 · Production (ongoing)** | Model cards, audit, human-in-loop ops, change control | Audit trail reproducible; quarterly model-card review live | --- # Blueprint 2 — Customer-Support Automation (retail banking) **Use case:** a grounded support agent answers customer questions from product docs, fee schedules, and account-policy content — with **strict masking of customer PII**, citations, and instant handoff to a human for anything account-specific or low-confidence. ## Architecture ```mermaid flowchart TB C[👤 Customer] --> CH[Support chat] CH --> ORCH2 subgraph ORCH2["Orchestration"] RT{{route:
info vs. account-action}} RT -- "general info" --> RAG[grounded RAG answer] RT -- "account-specific" --> AUTHZ{step-up auth + entitlement} AUTHZ -- ok --> TOOL[typed account tool via MCP
masked fields] AUTHZ -- fail / sensitive --> HUMAN[human handoff] RAG --> CONF{confidence ≥ SLA?} CONF -- no --> HUMAN CONF -- yes --> ANS[answer + citation] end subgraph GOV2["Zero-Trust + governance"] MASK[field-encrypt column masking] KILL[kill-switch per tool/model] LOG[event-store audit] end TOOL -.-> MASK RT -.-> KILL ANS -.-> LOG TOOL -.-> LOG ``` **Key design stances:** - **Two lanes by intent.** General-info → RAG over public/internal docs. Account-specific → typed MCP tool behind **step-up auth + entitlement check + field masking**. The model never free-queries customer data. - **Confidence gate → human.** Below SLA, hand off. In banking support, escalation is a feature, not a failure. - **PII never enters the prompt unmasked.** Masking is enforced at the MCP boundary (`field-encrypt`), so no prompt-engineering mistake can leak it. ## Phased delivery (condensed) 1. **Discovery** — intent taxonomy, what's answerable-from-docs vs. needs-account-access, PII map, SLAs. 2. **PoC** — info-lane RAG with citations + handoff; no account access yet. 3. **Account lane** — MCP typed tools, step-up auth, masking, full audit. 4. **Production** — eval harness, drift monitor, model cards, change control. --- # Cross-cutting: Regulatory control mapping This table is gold in the room — it shows you map *architecture* to *named clauses*. | Requirement | Source | How the architecture satisfies it | |---|---|---| | Model inventory & ownership | **SR 11-7** | Model-card registry (`04 §F`): every model/agent has a card with owner + purpose. | | Independent validation | **SR 11-7 / OCC** | RAGAS/DeepEval harness (`04 §E`) provides repeatable, independent eval evidence. | | Ongoing monitoring | **SR 11-7** | Online RAGAS scoring + factual-drift alerts in Hermes. | | Ability to constrain a model in production | **SR 11-7** | `kill-switch-client` disables a model/tool live, audited. | | Change control | **SR 11-7** | ADRs + CI eval gate; no deploy below faithfulness SLA. | | Risk classification of AI system | **EU AI Act** | Blueprint declares risk tier; high-risk paths get human oversight by design. | | Logging & traceability | **EU AI Act** | `event-store` decision log: query, sources, model, score, outcome — reproducible. | | Human oversight | **EU AI Act** | Confidence-gate → human handoff edge in both blueprints. | | Transparency to user | **EU AI Act** | Mandatory citations + "AI-assisted" disclosure + abstain language. | | Right to data protection / minimization | **GDPR / CCPA** | Field-level masking, role-aware retrieval, retrieve-only-entitled-chunks. | | Data subject access / deletion | **GDPR / CCPA** | Provenance metadata + tenant namespaces make targeted deletion + re-index feasible. | --- # Sample ADRs (the format they want you to produce) ### ADR-001 — Hybrid retrieval over pure-vector - **Status:** Accepted - **Context:** Compliance queries hinge on exact identifiers (clause numbers, reg citations) that dense retrieval misses. - **Decision:** Vector ⊕ BM25 fused with RRF, then cross-encoder rerank. - **Consequences:** +latency from rerank (mitigate: rerank top-k only); large recall/precision gain on identifier-bearing queries. ### ADR-002 — Typed MCP tool-calling over free Text-to-SQL for account data - **Status:** Accepted - **Context:** Account data is the highest-leakage surface; free SQL is hard to audit and inject-proof. - **Decision:** Account access only via typed, parameterized MCP tools behind auth + masking; generative SQL restricted to read-only analytics views with RLS. - **Consequences:** Slightly less flexible NL→data coverage; dramatically smaller attack surface and clean audit. ### ADR-003 — Abstain-and-escalate as a first-class outcome - **Status:** Accepted - **Context:** In regulated support/compliance, a confident wrong answer is the worst outcome. - **Decision:** Faithfulness/confidence below SLA routes to human handoff; tracked as an SLA, not an error. - **Consequences:** Higher human-handoff rate early; measurable safety + trust; abstain-rate becomes a tuning signal. ### ADR-004 — Provider-portable model layer (router seam) - **Status:** Accepted - **Context:** Data-residency + vendor-risk requirements vary per client. - **Decision:** All inference behind `llm-router`; default Azure OpenAI, swap-in Bedrock/Vertex, on-prem via Ollama. - **Consequences:** Small abstraction cost; residency + vendor-risk satisfied by config, not re-architecture.